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Amending a Statute of Limitations for
42 U.S.C. § 1983: More Than
"A Half Measure of Uniformity"
INTRODUCTION
Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code gives indi-
viduals a civil cause of action against any person who, under
color of state law, deprives them of rights guaranteed by fed-
eral law or the Constitution.1 It is the most popular2 and most
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the pur-
poses of this section; any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District
of Columbia.
IdL
To state a cause of action under this section, two elements must be present.
First, a party must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right.
Second, the party must allege that the person who has deprived him of that
right acted under color of state or territorial law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.
635, 640 (1979).
The 42d Congress enacted a portion of § 1983 as section 1 of the Ku Klux
Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). This Act, also known as the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, attempted to remedy the dual problems of Ku Klux Klan violence
against former slaves and the unwillingness of southern state courts to prose-
cute such claims.
2. For the annual reporting period ending June 30, 1987, the Administra-
tive Office of United States Courts classified 8.3% of the 238,982 cases filed in
federal district court as "civil rights cases." ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
OF THE ADmINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COuRTS 122 (1987).
Another 15.6% of this docket consisted of prisoner petitions. Id. It is likely
that a substantial portion of these cases were § 1983 claims. See Bauman, Civil
Rights Litigation: Section 1983, 1985 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203, 204 n.8.
Because precise statistical information on the number of § 1983 claims is
unavailable, any estimate of the percentage of § 1983 claims within the federal
docket is inexact. See Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and
Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 482, 533-36 (1982). One commentator es-
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potent 3 method of redress open to those seeking to prosecute
constitutional claims.4 Section 1983, despite its importance,
contains no limitations period.5
Before 1985, federal courts used diverse and conflicting
timated that § 1983 claims have accounted for approximately 12% of federal
district court civil cases annually since 1977. Bauman, supra, at 205 n.11.
In the last 25 years § 1983 has been put to myriad uses. As one prominent
jurist has noted:
In the context of racial equality, many of the major school desegrega-
tion cases were filed as § 1983 actions. In the First Amendment area,
§ 1983 was relied on for a challenge to state laws that required loyalty
oaths, or prevented the wearing of armbands in protest of our policy
in Vietnam. It was also used to restrain prosecutions under Louisi-
ana's ... Communist Control Law .... to establish [the NAACP's]
authority to advise Negroes of their legal rights .... [to establish] that
a welfare recipient has a right to notice and a hearing before his bene-
fits are terminated .... [and to confirm] due process rights of recipi-
ents of utility service, of public employees, of employees entitled
under state law to seek redress for unlawful discharge, and of debtors
whose property is about to be seized ....
Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the
Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1985) (foot-
notes omitted).
3. Judge Aldisert, writing for the Third Circuit, commented on the im-
portance of § 1983:
If, with Dean Eugene V. Rostow, we agree that the purpose of the
Constitution is to assure the people a free and democratic society and
that the final aim of that society is to provide as much freedom and
equality as possible for individuals, we can also agree that there has
been no procedural device in the modern era that has guaranteed
those assurances more than the remedies available through § 1983.
This statute furnishes bone and sinew to what Dean Rostow described
as the root idea of the Constitution: "man can be free because the
state is not."
Knoll v. Springfield Township School Dist., 699 F.2d 137, 143 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert granted, 468 U.S. 1204 (1984), vacated on other grounds and remanded,
471 U.S. 288 (1985).
4. Federal law provides relatively few civil actions for individuals seek-
ing to remedy constitutional rights violations. Litigants may bring actions
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) (action for deprivation of "full and equal benefit
of all laws ... for the security of persons and property"), id. § 1982 (action for
deprivation of rights to "inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey" prop-
erty), id. § 1985 (action for conspiracy to interfere with rights under Constitu-
tion and federal laws), and id. § 1986 (action for failure to prevent § 1985
conspiracy). Civil remedy against federal officials is also available under the
doctrine of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) ("Bivens" actions).
5. Many of the older civil rights acts of the 19th century were passed
without accompanying statutes of limitations. See generally Comment, Stat-
utes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 97,
97 [hereinafter ARIZONA Comment] (noting absence of limitations statutes for
Civil Rights Acts).
See supra note 1 for the text of § 1983.
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analyses to select appropriate statutes of limitations for section
1983 claims. 6 In that year, however, the United States Supreme
Court decided Wilson v. Garcia7 and partially clarified the con-
fusion by ruling that federal courts should borrow limitations
periods from state personal injury statutes." This formula has
helped promote the Court's goals of "uniformity, certainty, and
the minimization of unnecessary litigation"9 within state
boundaries. Nonetheless, ambiguous language in Wilson and
unanticipated complications in state law have made the decision
difficult to apply, have undercut predictability, and have im-
posed unduly shortened limitations periods. Together these
conditions inhibit both the sweep of section 1983 and the vindi-
cation of civil rights claims.
This Note argues that Congress should set a federal statute
of limitations for section 1983. The Note offers a model amend-
ment with the view that such an addition would preserve scarce
judicial resources, decrease the frequency and complexity of
section 1983 litigation, and better achieve the interests identi-
fied by the Supreme Court in Wilson. Part I explains the
methods courts have traditionally used to choose statutes of
limitations for section 1983 claims. Part II discusses Wilson, its
holding, and its reasoning. Part III analyzes the decision's limi-
tations and the problems it has created for the federal courts.
Part IV concludes that the best means of addressing these
problems is enactment of a federal limitations period and offers
a model amendment for section 1983.
I. SELECTING LIMITATIONS PERIODS FOR SECTION
1983 BEFORE WILSON
Statutes of limitations define the exact time period in
which a cause of action may be filed successfully.' 0 Federal law
6. Courts developed different methods of analogy to aid them in choosing
statutes of limitations from state laws. These included drawing factual analo-
gies to state actions, see infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text, statutory lia-
bility analogies, see infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text, analogies to
catch-all limitations periods, see infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text, and
general tort analogies, see infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
7. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
8. The Court, in a 7-1 decision (Justice O'Connor dissenting, Justice
Powell taking no part), held that § 1983 claims "are best characterized as per-
sonal injury actions" for purposes of borrowing local limitations periods. Id.,
471 U.S. at 280.
9. la at 275.
10. See W. FERGUSON, THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION SAVING STATUTES 1
(1978). Statutes of limitations govern the "limited period of time ... for the
1988]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
embraces the idea that a claim must not be brought at an unde-
fined future time,1 because just determinations of fact cannot
be made when memories have faded, witnesses have disap-
peared, or evidence has been lost.'2 Clearly defined limitations
periods protect defendants' 3 from stale claims and relieve
courts of the difficult task of coping with incomplete or blurred
facts.14 Finally, defined limitations periods serve "policies of
repose"' 5 by allowing potential defendants to calculate when
they are free from the threat of legal attack.16
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,17 enacted to
bringing of an action and, if the action is not commenced in time, the lapse of
time will constitute a defense to the suit or will deprive the plaintiff of his
right." .d
11. "A federal cause of action 'brought at any distance of time' would be
'utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws.'" Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,
271 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 341 (1805)).
12. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).
13. "Statutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness to de-
fendants. Such statutes 'promote justice by preventing surprises through the
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber .... ."' Id
14. "tT]he courts ought to be relieved of the burden of trying stale claims
when a plaintiff has slept on his rights." Id (quoting Order of R.R. Telegra-
phers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1964)).
15. Traditionally, statutes of limitations have been described as "statutes
of repose," promoting order, security, and stability in human affairs. See
United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1922) (quoting Rid-
dlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 390 (1868)); Campbell v.
Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 617 (1895).
16. The theory justifying such statutes is that even an injured party with
a just claim must put an adversary on notice to defend within the period of
limitations. A different result would be unjust because the right to be free of
stale claims prevails over the right to prosecute them. See Burnett v. New
York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1964). "In compelling circumstances, even
wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten." See Wil-
son v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985).
17. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). The Act represented an attempt by the 42d
Congress to remedy the problem of Ku Klux Klan violence against blacks and
the unwillingness of southern state courts to prosecute their claims.
Representative Lowe of Kansas, a strong supporter of the legislation,
characterized the situation in this way:
While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and
lynchings and banishment have been visited upon unoffending Ameri-
can citizens, the local administrations have been found inadequate or
unwilling to apply the proper corrective ... and the records of the
public tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence of effective
redress.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1871). See also i&i at 321 (remarks of
Rep. Stoughton); 332 (Rep. Hoar); 369-70 (Rep. Monroe); 389 (Rep. Elliot);
412-13 (Rep. E. Roberts); 428 (Rep. Beatty); 436-40 (Rep. Cobb); 516-17 (Rep.
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enforce the fourteenth amendment,1 8 contained no limitations
period. Because plaintiffs rarely used section 1983 in the years
following its enactment, 19 this omission raised no great contro-
versy.20 In 1961, however, the Court invigorated section 1983.21
As section 1983 became an increasingly popular vehicle for re-
dress of "constitutional torts,"22 the federal courts frequently
had to assign limitations periods to section 1983 claims. 23
Shellabarger); 606 (Sen. Pool); 654 (Sen. Osborn); 691 (Sen. Edmunds), noted
in Wilson, 471 U.S. at 276 n.36.
At least in theory, the Act could have provided a federal forum for the
former slaves. In reality, courts narrowly construed the Act and discrimina-
tory state statutes circumvented it. See T.,EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGA-
TION 58 (2d ed. 1987).
18. "[IThe Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, from which § 1983 is de-
rived... was passed 'for the express purpose of "enforc[ing] the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment."' " Lugar v. Edmundson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
934 (1982) (quoting Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 545 (1972)).
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19. Plaintiffs successfully invoked § 1983 only 21 times between 1871 and
1920. See T. EMERSON, C. HABER & N. DORNsEN, POLrnIcAL & CmL RIGHTS iN
THE UNITED STATES 1079 (stud. ed. 1967).
20. The Supreme Court first assigned a local limitations period to a § 1983
action in O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318 (1914) (action brought for racially
motivated deprivation of voting rights).
21. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part in Monell
v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monroe the Court rec-
ognized a plaintiff's cause of action under § 1983 for constitutional violations
suffered during an illegal police search. Id. at 192. In a 1981 opinion, then As-
sociate Justice Rehnquist noted the significance of Monroe: "It was not until
our decision in Monroe... that § 1983 was held to authorize immediate resort
to federal court whenever state actions allegedly infringed constitutional
rights ...." Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assoc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100,
104 (1981); see also Blackmun, supra note 2, at 19 (noting significance of
Monroe).
22. Professor Marshall Shapo first coined the term constitutional tort in
his article Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60
Nw. U.L. REv. 277, 323-24 (1965). The term has come to encompass the type of
conduct that gives rise to liability under § 1983. For a concise discussion, see
R. FREimICH & R. CARLISLE, SECTION 1983, SwoRD AND SHIELD: CrvIL RIGHTS
VIOLATIONs-THE LIABILTY OF URBAN, STATE AND LOcAL GOVERNMENT 3-4
(1983).
23. See, e.g., Hileman v. Knable, 391 F.2d 596, 597 (3d Cir. 1968) (applying
one-year limitations period for false arrest and malicious prosecution to § 1983
claim); Gaito v. Strauss, 368 F.2d 787, 788 (3d Cir. 1966) (affirming lower
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A. BORROWING LIMITATIONS PERIODS FROM STATE STATUTES
The process by which courts select a period of limitations
for a federal law is well established. Federal law2 directs
courts to borrow from state law to fill gaps in federal law as
long as the borrowed state provisions do not conflict with fed-
eral law or policy.25 Courts borrow state law limitations peri-
ods to the extent that such periods are consistent with the
polices underlying federal laws.2 6 When borrowing a local limi-
tations period for a section 1983 action, each federal court must
apply a three-step formula.2 7 First, the court establishes that
no federal rule governs the claim. 2 Second, the court considers
court's application of one-year false arrest and malicious prosecution periods);
Crawford v. Zeitler, 326 F.2d 119, 121 (6th Cir. 1964) (applying four-year catch-
all provision); Swan v. Board of Higher Educ., 319 F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 1963)
(applying six-year limitations period for actions arising from statute); Smith v.
Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962) (applying three-year limitations pe-
riod for actions arising from statute).
24. In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) reads:
[1In all cases where [federal civil rights laws] ... are deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses
against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the consti-
tution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction
... is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said
courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
1d. (emphasis added).
25. The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982), also sanctions the
practice of "borrowing" limitations periods from state law. In relevant part,
the Act provides: "[tlhe laws of the ... states, except where the Constitution
... treaties... or Acts of Congress otherwise require... shall be regarded as
the rules of decision ... in cases where they apply." Id.
26. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985) (citing Runyon v. Mc-
Crary, 427 U.S. 160, 180-82 (1976); Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383
U.S. 696, 704 (1966); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta,
203 U.S. 390, 397-98 (1906); McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 158 (1905); Camp-
bell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 617 (1895)).
27. In Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42 (1984), the Supreme Court provided
the following three-step procedure to aid courts in applying § 1988 to § 1983 ac-
tions. "First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States so far as such
laws are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into ef-
fect." Id. at 48. Thus, if an issue is covered by the federal law, the federal rule
controls. "[Second,] [i]f no suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake the
second step by considering the application of state" law. Id. Finally, "[a] third
step asserts the predominance of the federal interest: courts are to apply state
law only if it is not 'inconsistent with!" federal law. Id. See generally
Schwartz, Statute of Limitations in Section 1983 Actions, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE
REv. 638, 638 (1985) (explaining three-step procedure under § 1988 for deter-
mining applicable procedural rule in § 1983 actions).
28. Burnett, 468 U.S. at 48.
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applying an analogous state law.29 Finally, the court applies a
state limitations period if it is consistent with federal law.30 In
order to clarify the borrowing process, the Supreme Court has
announced several additional directives to help courts select
among various available state limitations periods.3' Before
Wilson, for example, the Supreme Court counseled federal
courts to apply the "most appropriate" 32 or "most analogous" 33
state statute of limitations. Because the Supreme Court sup-
plied these terms without much explanation or elaboration, and
because they are not synonymous, they failed to provide effec-
tive guidance to the lower courts.3
B. THE USE OF ANALOGIES IN THE BORROWING PROCESS
Although the lower federal courts understood the need to
employ general borrowing principles, they did not agree on spe-
cifics. Faced with an ever-increasing docket of section 1983 ac-
tions35 and a lack of concise direction from the Supreme Court,
lower courts used several different analogies when assigning
limitations periods to section 1983 claims.36
29. Id
30. Id.
A state procedural rule (or limitations period) is "consistent" with federal
law if it does not frustrate the policies behind § 1983. Courts will not judge
state rules inconsistent simply because their application defeats a claimant's
cause of action. Rather, the key question is whether the state law is generally
hospitable to § 1983 actions. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
See generally Schwartz, supra note 27, at 639 (discussing analysis of state law
for consistency with federal law in § 1983 actions).
31. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980) (recognizing
application of "most analogous" state limitations statute); Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975) (directing courts to apply "most
appropriate" state limitations period).
32. Railway Express, 421 U.S. at 462.
33. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 488.
34. A state statute that is most closely "analogous" to a federal cause of
action might not be "most appropriate" to federal policy. See Schwartz, supra
note 27, at 639. For example, a court hearing a § 1983 claim for false arrest
might find that a statute governing claims against state officials sets forth the
state limitations period "most appropriate" to federal policy. See Blake v. Kat-
ter, 693 F.2d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 1982). For the same claim, a court could find
that the most "analogous" statute is one governing state malicious prosecution
claims.
35. See supra note 2.
36. See generally infra notes 37-71 and accompanying text (discussing
methods adopted by lower courts prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Wilson); Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 643-48 (10th Cir. 1984), affd, 471 U.S.
261 (1985) (discussing development of various analogies used by circuit courts
in assigning limitations periods); Biehler, Limiting the Right to Sue: The Civil
1988]
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1. Factual Analogies
In their quest to choose the most appropriate or analogous
limitations periods for section 1983 claims, the federal courts
developed an array of analyses. Under the factual 37 analysis,
determining the appropriate local limitations period required a
case-by-case review of the facts of each alleged civil rights viola-
tion. Courts adopting this approach 38 drew analogies between
section 1983 constitutional torts and common-law tort actions.
Finding a proper analogy, courts selected the limitations period
a state court would have applied to that species of state claim.39
When a claimant filed an action alleging deprivation of his con-
stitutional rights after a police officer allegedly beat and
threatened him,40 for example, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit applied the limitations period for
an analogous common-law assault cause of action.
41
The factual analysis forced courts to undertake time-con-
suming dissections of individual claims and to assign different
limitations periods to allegations within the same section 1983
complaint.4 In addition, litigants spent a great deal of time at-
tempting to force constitutional claims into favorable state com-
Rights Dilemma, 33 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 15-27 (1983-84); Kibble-Smith, Statutes
of Limitation and Section 1983: Implications for Illinois Civil Rights Law, 20
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 415, 418-21 (1987) (explaining various analogies used by
circuit courts); ARIZONA Comment, supra note 5, at 99-102; Note, A Call for
Uniformity: Statutes of Limitation in Federal Civil Rights Actions, 26 WAYNE
L. REV. 61, 65-67 (1979) [hereinafter WAYNE Note].
37. Several commentators have adopted the term factual analysis when
discussing the problem of choice of a limitations period for § 1983 claims. See
Biehler, supra note 36, at 16; Kibble-Smith, supra note 36, at 418.
38. The following circuits employed a factual analysis in determining
what limitations periods applied to specific § 1983' actions: Third, in Aitchison
v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 103 (3d Cir. 1983); Eleventh, in McGhee v. Ogburn, 707
F.2d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 1983); District of Columbia, in McClam v. Barry, 697
F.2d 366, 374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Fifth, in Morrell v. City of Picayune, 690 F.2d
469, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1982); Sixth, in Kilgore v. City of Mansfield, 679 F.2d 632,
634 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); First, in Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 107
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 893 (1980); Tenth, in Zuniga v. A1FAC Foods,
Inc., 580 F.2d 380, 383 (10th Cir. 1978). See Biehler, supra note 36, at 16-21;
Note, Civil Rights: Determining the Appropriate Statute of Limitations for
Section 1983 Claims, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 440, 442 (1986) [hereinafter No-
TRE DAME Note].
39. See, e.g., Shaw v. McCorkle, 537 F.2d 1289, 1292 (5th Cir. 1976) (apply-
ing "state limitation period the state itself would have enforced had plaintiff
... [sought] similar relief in a court of that state" to § 1983 action).
40. See McClam v. Barry, 697 F.2d 366, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
41. Id at 376. The court applied D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301(4) (1981) (pro-
viding one-year limitations period for assault and battery). Id
42. See, e.g., Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc) (ap-
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mon-law pigeon holes.43 This approach was costly in terms of
judicial resources and advanced neither predictability nor the
policies of repose" underlying federal statutes of limitations.45
Nonetheless, at least seven circuits employed the factual
analysis.46
2. Statutory Liability Analogies
Another popular method of determining the analogous or
most appropriate limitation focused on statutory rather than
common law. Under the statutory liability analysis, courts rea-
soned that because the section 1983 action stemmed from a fed-
eral statute, they should borrow the local limitations period
from a state statute governing actions created by statute.47 In
some cases, courts applying this analysis drew upon state stat-
utes expressly intended to govern section 1983 claims,48 reason-
plying one-year state statute to § 1983 claims analogous to false arrest and two-
year wrongful injury statute to claims analogous to assault and battery).
43. See Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 649-50 (10th Cir. 1984), aqffd, 471
U.S. 261 (1985):
Attempting to compare civil rights claims with particular state law ac-
tions creates other problems that are clearly revealed by our own ex-
perience and by our examination of the results of this approach in
other circuits. Virtually any section 1983 claim is arguably analogous
to more than one state cause of action.
I& (emphasis added) (citing Clulow v. Oklahoma, 700 F.2d 1291, 1299-1300
(10th Cir. 1983) ("Although it could be argued that [plaintiff's] claims are in
part similar to a false imprisonment action... [we apply a] general tort of in-
terference with individual rights ... ."); Shah v. Halliburton Co., 627 F.2d 1055,
1059 (10th Cir. 1980) (Q 1981 case) ("there is a substantial question in this case
whether to apply the Oklahoma two-year statute applicable or the three-year
statute applicable to contract actions and liability created by statute").
Nonetheless, some commentators found the flexibility of this approach at-
tractive. See Kibble-Smith, supra note 36, at 418-19 ("Presumably, this ap-
proach preserved the flexibility to characterize a claim by analogy to state law,
as a right arising under statute, or by referring to a 'catch-all' statute of limita-
tion.") (footnotes omitted).
44. See supra notes 1316 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 13-16.
46. See supra note 38.
47. In some instances, state law supplied a limitations period for actions
created by statute. See, e.g., Lamb v. Amalgamated Labor Life Ins. Co., 602
F.2d 155, 158 n.2 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (applying Mo. REV. STAT. §
516.120(2) (1952), which imposed five-year limitations period on statutory ac-
tions, to § 1983 claim alleging conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of constitutional
rights).
48. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265(1) (1975) (assigning two-year limita-
tions period to § 1983 claims). In relevant part, the statute reads:
every public body is liable for its torts, and those of its officers,
employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment or
duties, whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function
1988]
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ing that state legislatures should be allowed to select an
applicable limitations period.49 Some commentators criticized
the statutory liability analogy because it created inconsistent
section 1983 limitations periods when federal courts in different
states applied the same analysis.50 Others disliked adopting
limitations periods motivated by state interests, 51 or noted ana-
lytical flaws in the analogy.52 To its credit, the statutory liabil-
ity analogy achieved state-wide uniformity and avoided forcing
constitutional torts into common-law pigeon holes.53 Four cir-
.... As used in [this section] . . . 'tort' includes any violation of 42
U.S.C. section 1983.
Id.
49. In the view of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: "[w]hen the state
has expressly made that selection the federal courts should accept it unless to
do so would frustrate the purposes served by the federal law. . . ." Kosikow-
ski v. Bourne, 659 F.2d 105, 107 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.265(1) (1975), two-year statute applicable to § 1983 claims). But see John-
son v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1978) (rejecting VA. CODE ANN. § 8-
24 (1950), one-year limitation on all § 1983 claims).
50. See WAYNE Note, supra note 36, at 68 ("an inherent inconsistency ex-
ists .... [when] two courts might agree as to the proper characterization of the
federal action, [and] the results may be different if the courts sit in different
states").
51. This criticism goes beyond the statutory liability analogy to the heart
of the "borrowing" process. Some critics contend that only a federal limita-
tions period should govern § 1983 actions. They argue that state limitations pe-
riods, although sufficient for state actions, cannot properly govern federal
constitutional claims. Proponents of this approach often cite Justice Harlan's
famous concurrence in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961): "a deprivation of a
constitutional right is significantly different from and more serious than a vio-
lation of a state right and therefore deserves a different remedy even though
the same act may constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitu-
tional right." Id. at 196. See generally ARIZONA Comment, supra note 5, at
112-15 (discussing Justice Harlan's concurring opinion and citing cases in
which courts adopted limitations periods enacted for § 1983).
52. The gist of this "analytical" criticism rests with the nature of § 1983.
Because § 1983 does not create substantive rights, but rather enforces other
rights existing in the Constitution and federal law, it makes little sense to
analogize § 1983 to a statute that creates both a substantive right and a rem-
edy. See, e.g., Jarmie, Selecting an Analogous State Limitations Statute in Re-
construction Civil Rights Acts Claims: The Tenth Circuit's Resolution, 15
N.M.L. REV. 11, 25 (1985) (noting that statutory liability analogy "is flawed in
that it focuses on the statutory remedy and away from the elements of the
cause of action"); Sagafi-Nejad, Proposed Amendments to Section 1983 Intro-
duced in the Senate, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 373, 404 (1983) (noting importance of
national interest in protecting constitutional rights); NOTRE DAME Note, supra
note 38, at 443 (noting that § 1983 does not create substantive rights, but rather
enforces rights originating elsewhere in federal law).
53. The Seventh Circuit defended its application of the statutory liability
analysis because it avoided "the strained process of characterizing civil rights
claims as common law torts." See Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 336-37 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978). The court also noted that
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cults adopted this method.54
3. Catch-All Analogies
When courts applying the statutory liability analysis occa-
sionally failed to locate a statutory liability provision in rele-
vant state law, they often employed a catch-all analysis.1
Catch-all statutes provide limitations periods for all state ac-
tions not otherwise limited.56 Under the logic of the catch-all
analogy, because Congress enacted section 1983 without a limi-
tations period, a state catch-all limitations provision should be
applied. This approach provided more predictable outcomes
than the factual analogy because it did not require courts to re-
view claims on the basis of their underlying facts. The catch-all
approach, however, provided less uniformity than the statutory
liability approach. Presumably, a "settled" catch-all limitations
period could be displaced if a state legislature adopted a more
closely analogous limitations period. Like the statutory liability
analogy, the catch-all approach proved objectionable 57 because
it used an arbitrary means to choose a federal limitations pe-
"[i]nconsistency and confusion would result if the single cause of action cre-
ated by Congress were fragmented in accordance with analogies drawn to
rights created by state law and the several different periods of limitation appli-
cable to each state-created right were applied to the single federal cause of ac-
tion." Id. at 337 (quoting Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962)).
54. See Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir.
1981); Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 866 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1000 (1982); Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1092 (4th Cir. 1980); Beard v.
Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978); see
also Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400, 406 n.11 (8th Cir.) (en banc), (stating that
state limitations period for actions based on statutory liability "may appropri-
ately govern" federal civil rights action although state law provided no such
period in this case), cert denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982) noted in Biehler, supra
note 36, at 16-27; NOTRE DAME Note, supra note 38, at 443 n.25.
55. See, e.g., McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir. 1984) (ap-
plying Colorado's "residency," three-year statute of limitations); Garmon v.
Foust, 668 F.2d 400, 406 & n.11 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Iowa's "general catch-
all," five-year statute of limitations where state law provided no specific period
for actions based on statutory liability); Baker v. F & F Inv. Co., 420 F.2d 1191,
1198 (7th Cir.) (applying five-year Illinois catch-all statute), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 821 (1970); Greenfield v. District of Columbia, 623 F. Supp. 47, 50 (D.D.C.
1985) (applying three-year District of Columbia catch-all statute); see generally
ARIZONA Comment, supra note 5, at 123-24 (explaining catch-all provisions).
56. See Rinehart v. Locke, 454 F.2d 313, 315 (7th Cir. 1971); Franklin v.
City of Marks, 439 F.2d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 1971); Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59,
63-64 (7th Cir. 1958); Shorters v. City of Chicago, 617 F. Supp. 661, 666 (N.D.
IM. 1985); see generally ARIZONA Comment, supra note 5, at 101 (citing cases in
which courts employed catch-all analogy).
57. See NOTRE DAME Note, supra note 38, at 443.
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riod.55 The catch-all approach also chose federal limitations pe-
riods based on legislation enacted by state legislators to satisfy
state interests.59 At least four circuits adopted the catch-all
approach.60
4. General Tort Analogies
The general tort analysis characterized all section 1983 ac-
tions by analogy to the same common-law tort.61 Thus, after an
initial determination that a certain class of tort characterized
section 1983 actions, uniformity resulted. A section 1983 action
alleging wrongful termination of employment 62 would receive
the same characterization as a section 1983 action alleging po-
lice brutality.6 3 This approach aided policies of repose and pre-
dictability and created uniformity within states. Nevertheless,
some critics questioned the wisdom of applying a single classifi-
cation to section 1983, an action capable of encompassing myr-
iad claims.64
58. Unlike these arbitrary analogies, selection of a uniform federal limita-
tions period would result from a deliberative process. Congress could best tai-
lor a limitations period that recognizes federal policy goals and the intent of
the 42d Congress.
59. See supra note 51. Although some courts questioned the use of a state
limitations period in the protection of a federal cause of action, the catch-all
analogy had one clear advantage. Because states applied catch-all statutes
widely, they could not modify them to eviscerate § 1983 without affecting
other state claims. This provided a measure of protection not present in states
where legislatures set unduly short limitations periods to limit federal claims.
60. See supra note 55.
61. See, e.g., Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de Choudens, 575 F.2d 315,
318-19 (1st Cir. 1978) (applying one-year limitations period for tort actions to
§ 1983 unconstitutional discharge claim); Madison v. Wood, 410 F.2d 564, 567
(6th Cir. 1969) (applying three-year limitations period to claim of discrimina-
tory demotion).
62. See Jackson v. City of Bloomfield, 731 F.2d 652, 653-54 (10th Cir. 1984)
(applying New Mexico general personal injury statute to § 1983 action alleging
wrongful termination of employment).
63. See Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 651 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (ap-
plying New Mexico general personal injury statute to § 1983 action alleging po-
lice brutality), aff'd, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
64. See, e.g., Note, Choice of Law Under Section 1983, 37 U. CHi. L. REV.
494, 504 (1970) (concluding that "[t]o impose one statute of limitations for ac-
tions so diverse would . . . disregard the unanimous judgments of the states
that periods of limitations should vary with the subject matter of the claim"),
quoted with approval in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 283 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); see also Blackmun, supra note 2, at 19-20 (discussing diversity
of § 1983 claims since Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
In his opinion for the majority, Justice Stevens addressed the claimed di-
versity concern. He noted that because most constitutional torts can be analo-
gized to several common-law torts and because each state has many different
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Although section 1983 is used frequently to redress widely
differing civil rights claims, the statute lacks a limitations pe-
riod. Federal courts have struggled with vague and potentially
contradictory commands that they apply analogous65 or appro-
priate6 limitations periods to claims and have produced little
symmetry or predictability.67 Different courts have assigned
limitations based on individual facts,68 general tort characteri-
zations, 69 or a system of statutory liability;70 some courts have
adopted more than one approach.71 Against this confused back-
drop, the Tenth Circuit attempted to establish a rule72 and the
Supreme Court passed judgment.73
II. THE WILSON CASE
On January 28, 1982, Gary Garcia filed an action in the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.
74
In his complaint Garcia named as defendants Richard Wilson, a
limitations periods, a nonuniform classification might assign many different
limitations periods to elements of the same claim. Such a confusing system
does not effectuate the intent of § 1983 because "the legislative purpose to cre-
ate an effective remedy for the enforcement of federal civil rights is obstructed
by uncertainty in the applicable statute of limitations, for scarce resources
must be dissipated by useless litigation on collateral matters." Wilson v. Gar-
cia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985).
65. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
67. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266.
[Tihe courts vary widely in the methods by which they characterize a
section 1983 action, and in the criteria by which they evaluate the ap-
plicability of a particular state statute of limitations to a particular
claim. The actual process used to select an appropriate statute varies
from circuit to circuit and sometimes from panel to panel.
Id (quoting Garcia, 731 F.2d at 643).
68. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Gashgai v. Leibowitz, 703 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1983) (factual
analysis); Kilgore v. City of Mansfield, 679 F.2d 632, 634 (6th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam) (factual analysis); Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400, 406 (8th Cir. 1982)
(catch-all approach); Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 107 (1st Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 893 (1980); Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de Choudens, 575
F.2d 315, 318-19 (1st Cir. 1978) (general tort analogy); Mason v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 517 F.2d 520, 522 (6th Cir. 1975) (statutory liability); Johnson v. Dailey 479
F.2d 86, 88 (8th Cir.) (factual analysis), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1009 (1973);
Madison v. Wood, 410 F.2d 564, 567 (6th Cir. 1969) (general tort).
72. See Garcia, 731 F.2d at 642.
73. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280.
74. See Garcia, 731 F.2d at 651. Garcia framed his cause of action under
§ 1983. Id. at 642. Two elements are needed to bring this cause of action. See
supra note 1.
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New Mexico state police officer, and Martin Vigil, the state po-
lice chief.7 5 Garcia alleged that Wilson violated his constitu-
tional rights by severely beating him and spraying him with
tear gas.76 Garcia also alleged that Vigil had been grossly negli-
gent in the performance of his supervisory duties.7 7 The de-
fendants moved to dismiss, asserting that the two-year 78 statute
of limitations provided in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act
barred the suit.7 9 The district court denied the motion ° and
held that a four-year catch-all statute81 governed the claim.8 2
This holding conflicted with a ruling of the New Mexico
Supreme Court supporting the defendants' position.8 3 The dis-
trict court certified the limitations issue to the Tenth Circuit on
interlocutory appeal.84
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in a unani-
mous en bane decision, affirmed the district court's denial of
the motion to dismiss but found that every section 1983 claim
"is in essence an action to recover for injury to personal
75. Garcia, 731 F.2d at 642.
76. Id.
77. Id- Specifically, Garcia alleged that Vigil had not properly supervised,
trained, and disciplined Wilson, that he had hired Wilson with the knowledge
that the officer had been convicted of several serious crimes, and that he had
not issued reprimands after Wilson had beaten other county residents. Id. In
addition, two high-ranking New Mexico state police officers had advised Vigil
not to hire Wilson. Id
78. Garcia filed his complaint approximately two years and nine months
after the claim allegedly arose. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 263.
79. Id Two years earlier, the New Mexico Supreme Court had held that
the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-12 (1978), governed
all § 1983 claims filed against state police officers. See DeVargas v. State, 97
N.M. 563, 564, 642 P.2d 166, 167 (1982).
80. See Garcia, 731 F.2d at 642.
81. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-4 (1978) (applying to "all actions not
herein otherwise provided for and specified within four years").
82. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 264.
83. See supra note 79.
84. See Garcia, 731 F.2d at 642. A federal district court may certify issues
to the appellate level under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982). This provision allows a
federal district judge to appeal an order when "such [an] order involves a con-
trolling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion [if that appeal] ... may materially advance the ultimate termination
of litigation." Id.
In earlier cases, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had used at least
three different analogies to characterize § 1983 claims. See Garcia v. Univer-
sity of Kansas, 702 F.2d 849, 851 (10th Cir. 1983) ("injury to rights" analogy);
Clulow v. Oklahoma, 700 F.2d 1291, 1299 (10th Cir. 1983) (general tort anal-
ogy); Spiegel v. School Dist. No. 1, 600 F.2d 264, 265-66 (10th Cir. 1979) (statu-
tory liability analogy).
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rights. '8 5 Dismissing both the district court's choice of a catch-
all statute and the defendants' contention that the New Mexico
Tort Claims Act controlled, the Court of Appeals determined
that a third statute, governing "injur[ies] to the person or repu-
tation of any person," best characterized section 1983 actions.86
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.8 7
After noting the pivotal importance of limitations peri-
ods,8 and summarizing the conflicting methods by which the
lower courts had characterized section 1983 actions,8 9 the Court
affirmed the Tenth Circuit.90 Writing for the majority,91 Jus-
tice Stevens communicated the Court's view that "[h]ad the 42d
Congress expressly focused on the issue decided today, . . . it
would have characterized § 1983 as conferring a general remedy
for injuries to personal rights. '92 The opinion concluded that
"§ 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury
actions. '93
In her lone dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the major-
ity for adopting a single classification for all section 1983 claims.
She found no justification for abandoning the practice of apply-
ing state law analogies to section 1983 claims and "the policies
§ 1988 embodies. '94 In Justice O'Connor's view, the state bor-
rowing rule remained workable.95 She questioned the value of
the personal injury classification 96 and expressed concern that
85. Garcia, 731 F.2d at 651.
86. Id- (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (1978)).
87. "[TMhe conflict, confusion, and uncertainty concerning the appropriate
statute of limitations to apply to this most important, and ubiquitous, civil
rights statute provided compelling reasons" for the Supreme Court to hear the
case. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266.
88. "'Few areas of the law stand in greater need of firmly defined, easily
applied rules than does the subject of periods of limitations."' Id (quoting
Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 667 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
89. Id at 276.
90. Id
91. Id. at 262. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision
of the case; Justice O'Connor filed the sole dissenting opinion.
92. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 278 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 280.
94. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
95. See id. at 282 ("Despite vocal criticism of the 'confusion' created by in-
dividualized statutes of limitations, most Federal Courts of Appeals and state
courts have continued the settled practice of seeking appropriate factual analo-
gies for each genus of § 1983 claim.").
96. See id at 284 ("The Court's all-purpose analogy is appealing; after all,
every compensable injury, whether to constitutional or statutory rights,
through violence, deception or broken promises, to a person's pocketbook, per-
son or dignity, might plausibly be described as a 'personal injury.' But so
sweeping an analogy is no analogy at all.").
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the statutes of many states would not provide a single, clearly
applicable limitations period.97 Further, Justice O'Connor ac-
cused the Court of legislating a limitations rule where congres-
sional silence counseled restraint98 and of foreclosing legislative
creativity on the part of the states to gain "only a half measure
of uniformity." 99
III. THE PROBLEMS REMAINING AFTER WILSON
The Supreme Court's decision in Wilson represented an in-
cremental improvement over previous methods used in choos-
ing the appropriate statute of limitations for section 1983. The
decision provided plaintiffs a clear timetable for filing at least
some section 1983 claims.100 By providing a general tort charac-
terization, the Court freed judicial resources in federal districts
where the characterization could be easily applied. Although it
promoted these worthy ends, the Wilson decision was flawed.
When lower courts applied the decision, practical problems sur-
faced. These practical problems made Wilson's application un-
certain and confusing and raised serious policy questions.
A. APPLYING THE WILSON ANALOGY: PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
1. Locating an Appropriate Tort Statute
As Justice O'Connor had anticipated in her dissent,101
97. After noting that most states have several different personal injury
statutes from which to choose, and citing several Tenth Circuit cases, Justice
O'Connor commented that "there is no guarantee state law will obligingly sup-
ply a limitations period to match an abstract analogy." Id. at 287.
In making this criticism of the Court's general tort analogy, Justice
O'Connor anticipated a problem that would come to plague lower courts apply-
ing Wilson. The majority's direction to select limitation periods applicable to
"personal injury statutes" or "generalized personal injury statutes" lacked
specificity needed to provide meaningful guidance. Although New Mexico law
provided a single general personal injury statute, see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8
(1978), in Wilson, other states offered a statutory cafeteria. In New York, for
instance, federal courts were asked to choose from a three-year period for per-
sonal injury claims based upon negligence, see N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 214(5)
(1972), and a one-year period for personal injury claims based on intentional
torts, see id. § 215(3), noted in Schwartz, supra note 27, at 640.
98. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 284 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 285.
100. Although after Wilson § 1983 claims brought within the same state
were treated identically, the decision did not create uniformity among or even
within the federal circuits. Thus, plaintiffs and defendants involved in inter-
state § 1983 litigation remained uncertain as to what statutes of limitations
would apply in their cases.
101. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 286-87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
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lower courts found the Wilson rule difficult to use when state
law in a given jurisdiction contained no obvious "general" per-
sonal injury statute.1 0 2 Although the majority had stated that
section 1983 claims are "best characterized as personal injury
actions,"'01 3 this abstract analogy has offered little guidance
when applied to a concrete body of state law. Several cases il-
lustrate this problem.
In Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin,0 4 the Eleventh Circuit
failed to find a general personal injury statute in Alabama law.
Although state law contained a provision for "'injury to the
person or rights of another not arising from contract,' "105 the
Jones court, reviewing legislative history, found that this stat-
ute did not apply to the "acts of intentional and direct violence"
that prompted passage of section 1983.'L 6 The court held that a
statute governing claims for "trespass to person or liberty such
as false imprisonment or assault and battery"'0 7 best suited the
intentional nature of section 1983 claims.' 0 8 In Jones, neither
state statute that the court considered provided an exact fit.
The Eleventh Circuit, forced to analogize, resorted to the legis-
lative history of section 1983 and reached an unpredictable out-
come. 0 9 This lack of certainty is exactly what Wilson's
O'Connor also believed that because states characterized their tort actions in
many different ways, "[t]oday's decision [selecting a general tort analogy for
all § 1983 claims] does not so much resolve confusion as banish it to the lower
courts." Id at 286.
102. The Wilson court had instructed the lower courts to borrow limita-
tions periods for § 1983 claims from state statutes providing "general remedy
for injuries to personal rights." See id at 278.
Several lower federal courts had difficulty isolating such a statute. See,
e.g., Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250, 1256 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying
statute of limitations applicable to trespass in absence of general personal in-
jury statute); McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir. 1984) (en
banc) (applying general tort analogy pre-Wilson and choosing to apply catch-
all statute to § 1983 claims); Greenfield v. District of Columbia, 623 F. Supp. 47,
50 (D.D.C. 1985) (applying catch-all statute instead of choosing between two
insufficient personal injury statutes); Shorters v. City of Chicago, 617 F. Supp.
661, 666 (N.D. IM. 1985) (finding that catch-all statute best fit Wilson charac-
terization when applied to Illinois law).
103. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280.
104. 763 F.2d 1250 (11th Cir. 1985).
105. Id at 1254 (citing ALA. CODE § 6-2-39(a)(5) (1975)).
106. Id at 1255-56.
107. Id at 1254 (citing ALA. CODE § 6-2-34(1) (1975)).
108. I at 1255.
109. The language of the Alabama "injury to the person" statute more
closely parallels the language selected by the Tenth Circuit in Garcia than the
"trespass to person" statute the Jones court selected. Nonetheless, the Wilson
court stressed the need for a generally applicable statute. In this respect, the
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uniform characterization sought to remedy. Although the
Jones court may or may not have reached an acceptable result,
the general tort analogy provided no easy answer.
Other courts have had difficulty choosing an appropriate
statute based on the Wilson Court's characterization. In
Shorters v. City of Chicago,110 an Illinois district court refused
to apply a state statute covering certain personal injury
claims 111 because the statute did not apply broadly.11 Basing
its decision on language in Wilson stressing the general appli-
cability and broad remedial sweep of section 1983,113 the
Shorters court applied a five-year catch-all statute.114 Arguably,
the language and the analysis announced in Wilson might have
supported either choice.115 As in Jones, the Shorters court
found that the Supreme Court's abstract analogy yielded
neither easy application nor an obvious state law
counterpart 16
Eleventh Circuit's application of such criteria cannot be read as inconsistent
with Wilson.
110. 617 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
111. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-202 (1987).
112. Shorters, 617 F. Supp. at 665-66.
113. See id at 663-64.
114. Id at 666. Accord Greenfield v. District of Columbia, 623 F. Supp. 47,
50 (D.D.C. 1985) (applying catch-all statute instead of choosing between two
insufficient personal injury statutes).
Commentators are divided on whether Shorters reflects a gap in the Wil-
son general tort analogy, or simply a misapplication. Compare Kibble-Smith,
supra note 36, at 430 (noting that Shorters is "well reasoned" and supporting
"soundness of this approach") with NoTRE DAME Note, supra note 38, at 447
(arguing that Shorters "plainly ignored" Wilson Court's personal injury char-
acterization).
Despite these conflicting views, Shorters demonstrates that the general
tort characterization does not always provide easy analogies to state law.
115. Compare Shorters, 617 F.2d at 663-64 (listing instances in which Wil-
son Court stressed "general" nature of § 1983 and of New Mexico statute cho-
sen to characterize § 1983 claims, and view that 42d Congress would have
approved general remedy for injuries to personal rights) with Wilson, 471 U.S.
at 278 (stating that "[t]he relative scarcity of statutory claims when § 1983 was
enacted makes it unlikely that Congress would have intended to apply the
catch-all periods of limitations for statutory claims that were later enacted by
many States").
The Tenth Circuit also chose a generally applicable catch-all over two
more specific personal injury statutes. See McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367,
1370 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (choosing to apply broadly applicable catch-all
statute, instead of two limited personal injury statutes, to § 1983 claims).
116. Three Fifth Circuit panels have set the limitations period for § 1983
claims by reference to a statute governing "actions... for injury done to the
estate or property of another." See Price v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 1026,
1028 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (citing TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526(1)
(Vernon 1979)) (emphasis added); Peter Henderson Oil Co. v. City of Port Ar-
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The problem of choosing an appropriate limitations period
based upon an abstract analogy is illustrated most clearly when
state law contains no personal injury limitation. Mismash v.
Murray,117 decided by the Tenth Circuit before the Supreme
Court affirmed Wilson, reflects this problem. In Mismash, the
court applied a Utah catch-all limitations period in the absence
of a general personal injury provision.:1 The abstract analogy
drawn by the Wilson Court adds little guidance in this situa-
tion. Although this problem has yet to emerge in post-Wilson
section 1983 litigation, courts have not yet applied the personal
injury analogy in every state. It is only a matter of time before
such a case arises.
2. Choosing Among State Tort Statutes
Another problem arose when lower courts selecting limita-
tions periods for section 1983 claims faced a choice between
more than one personal injury statute. In Garcia, the Tenth
Circuit applied the general tort analogy to choose one of three
potentially applicable limitations statutes. 1 9 Because two of
these statutes applied narrowly and one did not, the choice of a
"general remedy for injuries to personal rights"'2 0 posed no
great difficulty. Unfortunately, the law in some states offers
several almost indistinguishable choices.' 12 Federal courts ap-
plying the Wilson analogy in these jurisdictions have found the
selection process difficult. While Utah law had no general per-
sonal injury statute and Alabama law offered few choices, some
states have multiple tort limitations periods.2? The Supreme
Court's implicit assumption in adopting the general tort anal-
ogy, that most or all states provided the same narrow range of
thur, Texas, 806 F.2d 1273, 1275 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); Longoria v. City of Bay
City, 779 F.2d 1136, 1137 (5th Cir. 1986) (same). Although all three decisions
cited Wilson, the opinions did not explain the courts' understanding of the
case. Thus, it is unclear whether the application of a nonpersonal injury char-
acterization is the product of a gap in Texas law or simply a flawed application
of Wilson.
117. 730 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1052
(1985).
118. The Tenth Circuit specifically rejected a limitations period applicable
to "'action[s] for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment or seduc-
tion.'" Id at 1367. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-29(4) (1953).
119. See supra notes 79, 81, 86 and accompanying text.
120. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 278 (1985).
121. See supra notes 104-116 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (discussing Ohio's multi-
ple text statutes); supra note 97 (noting two of New York's tort statutes of
limitations).
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limitations periods present in New Mexico law, flawed Wilson
v. Garcia. A uniform characterization, quite Oseful in New
Mexico, is confusing when applied in states with more than one
general tort statute. Federal courts in these states have drawn
unpredictable and arbitrary distinctions.
In Mulligan v. Hazard,u2 for instance, the Sixth Circuit
was hard pressed to choose between two Ohio statutes.24 The
Mulligan court conducted a review of the legislative history of
section 1983 and chose a one-year limitations period applicable
to "libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, false
imprisonment or malpractice"125 over a two-year period for
"bodily injury. ' 126 Forced to choose between two closely re-
lated and equally applicable statutes, the Sixth Circuit found
implied guidance in Supreme Court dicta. The court narrowed
its statutory choice based on a distinction between intentional
and nonintentional torts.2-7 Although this distinction seems
plausible in light of legislative history, s28 it was not drawn in
the Supreme Court's opinion 2 9 and was hardly predictable.
123. 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986).
124. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2305.10, 2305.11 (Anderson 1981).
125. Mulligan, 777 F.2d at 343. See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (An-
derson 1981). At the time the cause of action arose in Mulligan, the statute
provided a limitations period for seven enumerated torts: "an action for libel,
slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment or mal-
practice will be barred if not brought within one year after the cause accrued."
Mulligan, 777 F.2d at 343.
126. Mulligan, 777 F.2d at 343 (citing Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (An-
derson 1981)). In relevant part, that statute stated: "[ain action for bodily in-
jury or injuring personal property shall be brought within two years after the
cause thereof arose." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Anderson 1981).
127. Mulligan, 777 F.2d at 344. The Court of Appeals based its distinction
on its perception of congressional intent:
The concern of Congress, thus, was with the perpetrators of inten-
tional tortious conduct. While both [the general and the specific state
statutes] theoretically encompass intentional tort actions, [the specific
statute), which applies to actions involving assaults, batteries and the
like, more specifically encompasses the sorts of actions which con-
cerned Congress when it enacted the civil rights statutes.
Id. at 344.
Although this finding may or may not represent the will of the 42d Con-
gress in enacting § 1983, it is a distinction that the Wilson Court never raised.
The intentional-nonintentional tort distinction, although helpful in choosing
between two closely related general tort statutes, is cut from whole cloth.
128. See supra note 17. Nonetheless, because the Wilson Court fully ad-
dressed congressional intent, any speculation or de novo review by the Sixth
Circuit was inappropriate.
129. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 278 (1985). According to the Court,
the 42d Congress would have "characterized § 1983 as conferring a general
remedy for injuries to personal rights." Id. (emphasis added).
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Two other courts also have seized on the intentional-noninten-
tional tort distinction to choose between equally applicable per-
sonal injury statutes.13 0
The Mulligan case illustrates a fundamental flaw in Wil-
son's general tort analogy. Because the Supreme Court as-
sumed that the range of personal injury statutes contained in
the law of New Mexico reflected the range in other states, the
Court made no allowance for situations in which two or more
statutes might be equally applicable. Compelled to use a blunt
instrument,131 federal courts drew arbitrary distinctions.132 In
the process, parties have been denied predictability. Moreover,
it is likely that courts have barred valid civil rights claims
unfairly.
3. Deciding Retroactive Application
When the Supreme Court decided Wilson, many section
1983 claims were pending or soon to be filed. Federal courts
hearing these cases had to decide whether to apply the Wilson
analogy retroactively or to select a previously established limi-
tations period.133 Because the Supreme Court failed to address
the issue of retroactive application in Wilson, it sent an ambig-
130. See Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916, 919 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1065 (1986); Cook v. City of Minneapolis, 617 F. Supp. 461, 463-65 (D.
Minn. 1985).
131. Justice O'Connor noted the Tenth Circuit's inability to apply its own
§ 1983 characterization in her dissent. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 286-87.
Other courts also have had difficulty applying the vague general tort anal-
ogy. See, e.g., Davis v. Harvey, 789 F.2d 1332, 1333 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting dis-
trict court's error in applying limitations period for Oregon Tort Claims Act
rather than general tort statute); Longoria v. City of Bay City, 779 F.2d 1136,
1137 (5th Cir. 1986) (selecting limitations period applicable to actions for "in-
jury done to property or estate of another").
Commentators have criticized the imprecise language in Wilson. See, e.g.,
Kibble-Smith, supra note 36, at 426 ('"The language of Wilson is frequently too
general to be useful.").
132. In McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984), for example,
the court approved the general tort analogy later adopted in Wilson, but faced
two personal injury statutes and so chose to apply Colorado's catch-all statute.
Id. at 1370. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 287 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
133. As a general rule, judicial decisions apply retroactively. See Solem v.
Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 642 (1984) (citing Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507-08
(1973)). In some cases, however, the Supreme Court has recognized excep-
tions. See Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 51
(1982); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 97 (1971).
Federal courts resolve the retroactivity issue by.determining "(1) whether
the decision establishes a new principle of law; (2) whether retroactive applica-
tion will further or retard the purposes of the rule in question; and
(3) whether applying the decision will produce substantial[ly] inequitable re-
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uous message to the lower courts. 34 This flaw led to inconsis-
tent treatment of section 1983 claims 135  and increased
litigation. 36 Courts disagreed about the intent of the Supreme
Court in Wilson. Some opinions have held that, because the
Court did not expressly address retroactivity, Wilson counseled
retroactive application. 37 Other courts, perhaps noting the
Supreme Court's observation that the Tenth Circuit itself had
chosen not to apply Wilson retroactively,138 reached opposing
results.139 A circuit split resulted.
sults." Barina v. Gulf Trading & Transp. Co., 726 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1984)
(citing Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07).
134. Because Wilson dealt with a limitations issue, claims could be barred
or revived by retroactive application of a shortened limitations period. Clear
guidance was crucial to achieving the Wilson Court's goals of "uniformity, cer-
tainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation." Wilson, 471 U.S. at
275.
135. Compare Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.
1987) (holding that Wilson does not apply retroactively), Eades v. Thompson,
823 F.2d 1055, 1058 n.1 (7th Cir. 1987) (same), Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d
1141, 1146 (7th Cir. 1986) (same), Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1340
(9th Cir. 1986) (same), and Abbit v. Franklin, 731 F.2d 661, 664 (10th Cir. 1984)
(en banc) (same) with Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 1987)
(holding that Wilson applies retroactively), Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794
F.2d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1986) (same), Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340, 344 (6th
Cir. 1985) (same), Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983, 987 (8th Cir. 1985) (same),
and Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 196-97, 197-98 (3d Cir. 1985)
(same).
136. Because the retroactivity issue remains unsettled, courts must address
it in all cases in which a plaintiff or defendant would benefit from a length-
ened or shortened limitations period.
137. See, e.g., Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496, 504 (6th Cir. 1987) ("Wilson
implicitly mandates that its holding be applied retroactively"); Mulligan v.
Hazard, 777 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1985) (same).
The theory that a decision should apply retroactively if the Supreme
Court does not expressly reject such an application is grounded in an analysis
of DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983). In that
case, the Supreme Court applied a statute of limitations retroactively even
though the Court did not explicitly discuss the retroactivity issue. Id. at 152.
A minority of courts has adopted the view that DelCostello directs retroactive
application of statute of limitations decisions in which the court is silent on the
retroactivity issue. See Smith v. General Motors Corp., 747 F.2d 373, 375 (6th
Cir. 1984) (en banc); Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239, 241 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984). The Sixth Circuit has applied this theory to the
Wilson holding. See Shipka, 818 F.2d at 499; Mulligan, 777 F.2d at 344.
138. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 265-66 n.10.
139. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987);
Eades v. Thompson, 823 F.2d 1055, 1058 n.1 (7th Cir. 1987); Anton v.
Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1146 (7th Cir. 1986); Gibson v. United States, 781
F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 1986); Abbit v. Franklin, 731 F.2d 661, 664 (10th Cir.
1984) (en banc); Jackson v. City of Bloomfield, 731 F.2d 652, 655 (10th Cir.
1984).
[Vol. 73:85
CIVIL RIGHTS
Guidance is clearly needed;140 when litigants face unpre-
dictable liability or barred claims, policies of repose suffer.141 A
lack of clarity, the definitive factor in inconsistent lower court
application of the Wilson opinion, also surfaced in the retroac-
tivity issue. The existing circuit split shows that Wilson has
yet to settle the problem of selecting a limitations period for
section 1983.142
Retroactive application aside, the Wilson court's opinion
did not anticipate situations in which state law refuses to mesh
with the general tort analogy. Unfortunately for the lower
courts, local law sometimes contains no general personal injury
statutes, 43 no obvious candidates,1' or multiple general tort
statutes.145 The courts necessarily make unpredictable and ar-
bitrary distinctions. In addition to these interpretive problems,
several key policy questions remain unanswered or inade-
quately answered after Wilson.
B. APPLYING THE WILSON ANALOGY: POLICY CONCERNS
1. Lack of Uniformity
Congress enacted section 1983 as a uniquely federal cause
of action that would vindicate rights when state remedies or
state enforcement proved ineffective. 46 The statute embodies
140. Justice Byron White agrees. See infra note 142. The Supreme Court
has addressed the issue of retroactive application in the context of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, which is now governed by the Wilson doctrine. See Goodman v. Luk-
ens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617, 2618 (1987) (upholding Third Circuit's retroactive
application of two-year personal injury limitations period where plaintiffs had
not relied on past limitations precedent); Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazragi,
107 S. Ct. 2022, 2025-26 (1987) (affirming Third Circuit holding that § 1981
claim should not be barred by retroactive application of personal injury limita-
tions period where "inconsistent with the purpose of the underlying substan-
tive statute and... manifestly inequitable").
141. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
142. At least one member of the Court is eager to resolve the issues of ex-
actly which statute to use for the characterization of § 1983 claims and
whether to apply it retroactively. Dissenting from a denial of certiorari, Jus-
tice White wrote: "[tihe Court's decision not to review the instant case marks
the third time this term that it has refused to address these differences that
exist between the courts of appeals; differences that are not likely to disappear
without guidance from this Court." See Mulligan v. Hazard, 476 U.S. 1174,
1175 (1986), denying cert. to 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985).
143. See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 104-116 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 119-32 and accompanying text.
146. In Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988) the Court observed:
'the central objective of the Reconstruction-Era civil rights statutes is
... to ensure that individuals whose federal constitutional or statu-
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an attempt to provide uniform access to a federal forum that is
in no way contingent upon state law. By providing such access,
section 1983 protects all persons equally and promotes confi-
dence in legal institutions. Unfortunately, by instructing the
lower courts to "select, in each state, the one most appropriate
statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims,"1 47 the Supreme
Court created only state-wide uniformity 4 This "half mea-
sure of uniformity"' 4 9 does not harmonize state law differences.
As a result, plaintiffs filing identical section 1983 actions will be
barred after one year in California,' 50 three years in New
York,' 5 ' and six years in Maine. 5 2 Because local personal in-
jury limitations periods are set according to local needs, 53
durations inevitably will differ. Reliance on state law ensures
vastly different results among and even within federal circuits
and creates an undesirable incentive for forum shopping when
constitutional tort claims cross state lines1 54 Thus, Wilson's
tory rights are abridged may recover damages or secure injunctive re-
lief.... Thus, § 1983 provides 'a uniquely federal remedy against
incursions'. . . and is to be accorded 'a sweep as broad as its language.'
... Any assessment of the applicability of a state law to federal civil
rights litigation, therefore, must be made in light of the purpose and
nature of the federal right.
Id. at 2307 (citations omitted). As one scholar commented:
The historical context of the passage of section 1983 and its judicially
elaborated purposes prove that it is a federal civil rights act designed
to implement federal law and provide a federal forum. That design
would be frustrated were courts to rely solely on state law to enforce
constitutional liberty and property.
Glennon, Constitutional Liberty and Property: Federal Common Law and Sec-
tion 1983, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 355, 383 (1978), noted in WAYNE Note, supra note
36, at 69. See also supra note 51 and accompanying text (noting that commen-
tators dislike borrowing state statutes to enforce federal rights because they
reflect state interests).
147. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985) (emphasis added).
148. Once a lower court chose a statute to characterize § 1983 claims, the
statute governed all such claims regardless of factual differences.
149. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 285 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
150. See Rivera v. Green, 775 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that
limitations period for § 1983 actions brought in California is one year).
151. See Okure v. Owens, 816 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying three-year
limitations period to § 1983 claim brought in New York).
152. See Small v. Inhabitants of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544, 549 (1st Cir. 1986)
(applying six-year limitation period to § 1983 claim brought in Maine).
153. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
154. A hypothetical situation illustrates the problem of forum shopping.
Assume that Anderson is driving from his home in Birmingham, Alabama, to
his parents' home in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Near the border of Mississippi
and Louisiana, Anderson stops to purchase gasoline. Bates, a Mississipi state
policeman, notices a political bumper sticker on Anderson's car that Bates be-
lieves identifies Anderson as a "communist sympathizer." Bates tails Ander-
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state law characterization promotes the imposition of complex
and expensive litigation upon what Congress intended to be a
simple matter for litigants, lawyers, and judges.1 55 This com-
plexity places a heavy burden on plaintiffs who cannot secure
expert legal advice.156 Finally, unpredictable, widely asymmet-
rical outcomes may convince parties that they have been un-
fairly judged or victimized and may undercut public confidence
in judicial institutions.
2. Confusing and Unnecessary Litigation
One of the primary goals of Wilson was to minimize un-
necessary litigation. 5 7 The logic was simple; if litigants could
gain no advantage from pigeon-holing claims based on underly-
son for several miles and arrests him without probable cause just inside the
Louisiana border. Anderson is strip-searched, assaulted, and detained by Bates
in a Mississippi jail for 48 hours.
Under the Wilson rule, Anderson would have one year to file a § 1983 ac-
tion in the officer's home state of Mississippi, see Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916,
917 (5th Cir. 1985), one year to file in Louisiana, where the wrongful arrest
occurred, see Saint Amant v. Benoit, 806 F.2d 1294, 1296 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986), and
six years in his own state of Alabama, see Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 763 F.2d
1250, 1256 (11th Cir. 1985).
155. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275 ("Congress intended the identification of
the appropriate statute of limitations [for § 1983] to be an uncomplicated task
for judges, lawyers, and litigants, rather than a source of uncertainty, and un-
productive and ever increasing litigation."); cf. infra notes 190-191 (discussing
potential complexity of § 1983 claims).
156. Before enacting the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), Congress noted the poverty of civil rights litigants, in-
cluding those filing under § 1983:
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who
must sue to enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire
a lawyer. If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights,
and if those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws are not to pro-
ceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to re-
cover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court.
REPORT OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITrEE, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat.
2641 (June 29, 1976).
More recently, Professor Nahmod concluded that § 1983 "is a favorite of
prisoners." See S. NA-MOD, CIVIL RIGHTs AND CIVIL LIBERTIEs LITIGATION
§ 3.07, at 134 (2d ed. 1986). Section 1983 also is used frequently to protect the
civil rights of migrant workers, mental patients, and nursing home residents.
See i&. § 2.09 and cases noted at 90-98.
Many of these litigants do not possess the resources to enter into complex
legal actions. Lack of uniformity and certainty places these plaintiffs at a spe-
cial disadvantage. Cf infra note 174 (setting forth authorities discussing unfa-
miliarity of average person injured by state action with constitutional law and
resulting delay in recognizing civil rights claims).
157. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275.
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ing fact patterns, courts could get on with business. 5 8 In real-
ity, Wilson's uniform characterization will not diminish
litigation significantly because courts applying it will spend
time attempting to locate a nonexistent general personal injury
statute, 5 9 selecting from unlikely choices, 160 or drawing distinc-
tions among several potentially applicable general tort stat-
utes.161 Litigants whose claims are barred or who are subject to
liability after such an inexact, unpredictable process will appeal
frequently.162 The unresolved circuit split on the issue of retro-
active application 16 3 will also encourage appeals. Finally, short-
ened limitations periods produced by the personal injury
analogy,' 64 and uncertainty concerning which period will gov-
ern and whether it will apply retroactively, will prompt parties
to sue first and negotiate later. 6 5 Courts will squander vital
time and resources contending with hasty, unripened claims
and immature damages.' 66
3. Shortened Limitations Periods
As a result of the personal injury analogy announced in
Wilson, several courts have shortened their limitations periods
for section 1983 actions.167 This creates two major problems.
158. Had the personal injury analogy been lucid and easy to apply, it is
likely that collateral litigation concerning applicable state limitations periods
would have declined. Unfortunately, because the new rule has created inter-
pretive difficulties and shortened the limitations periods applied in many fed-
eral courts, it is likely that the number of § 1983 claims filed will actually
increase in certain districts. See infra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496, 498 (6th Cir. 1987) (unsuc-
cessfully challenging Sixth Circuit's choice of characterizing statute in Mulli-
gan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1986)).
163. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
165. Defendants cannot adequately calculate liabilities or assert defenses if
they are uncertain which statute will apply and in which time period. Simi-
larly, plaintiffs may lose valid claims in reliance on an unsettled rule or rush
to file spurious ones. See Biehler, supra note 36:
Uncertainty affects every participant in the legal process. Not only
are potential plaintiffs and defendants unaware of the time in which
they must effectuate their rights, the attorneys to which they turn for
advice are not in much better positions. The court is similarly unable
to provide the parties before it with the correct solution.
Id at 6; accord Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 n.34 (1985).
166. See Biehler, supra note 36, at 6.
167. See, e.g., Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 558-59 (9th Cir.
1987) (noting that California limitations period for § 1983 actions decreased
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First, plaintiffs have less time to negotiate settlements and
to pursue nonlitigious, administrative remedies before filing
claims. Indeed, shortened limitations periods may actually in-
crease the volume of litigation.168 In federal courts in Ohio, for
example, where the section 1983 limitations period is one
year, 69 claimants have little opportunity to explore alterna-
tives to litigation.170 It is also likely that parties will file actions
before they are truly ripe or damages have matured.1 71 Settle-
ment negotiations may be sacrificed in an effort to toll a brief
or uncertain limitations period.172
Second, shortened limitations periods reduce the availabil-
ity of section 1983 actions. As the Supreme Court has noted,
the length of a limitations period reflects a value judgment con-
cerning the point at which the interests in prohibiting the pros-
ecution of stale claims outweigh the interests in prosecuting
valid ones.'7 3 In state tort statutes, this value judgment is pre-
minsed on compensation and orderly administration of personal
injury claims. Although these are significant interests, they
pale when compared to constitutional concerns. These funda-
from three years to one year as result of Wilson rule); Loy v. Clamme, 804
F.2d 405, 408 (7th Cir. 1986) (shortening Indiana § 1983 limitations period from
five to two years); Ridgeway v. Wapello County, 795 F.2d 646, 647 (8th Cir.
1986) (stating that Wilson shortened Iowa period from five to two years); An-
ton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1142 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that Illinois limi-
tations period has been shortened from five years before Wilson to two years
afterwards); Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340, 343 (6th Cir. 1986) (decreasing
Ohio § 1983 limitations period from two years to one year).
168. In a recent case that applied the personal injury analogy to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, Justice Brennan made the following observation:
A longer statute of limitations might actually reduce federal litiga-
tion. Cases arising under the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are likely to overlap with § 1981 claims.
If a short limitations period is imposed, plaintiffs in such cases will be
forced to file their suits before exhausting administrative remedies,
for fear of running out of time.
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617, 2630 n.11 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
This observation is equally valid in the case of § 1983. Section 1983 might
also overlap with remedies contained in the acts Justice Brennan cites. Other
state and federal remedies might also overlap, and be abandoned, with a short
limitations period.
169. See Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1985), cert denied,
476 U.S. 1174 (1986) (discussed supra notes 123-129 and accompanying text).
170. Justice Brennan has argued with some force that the application of
brief limitations pushes claimants to litigate before exhausting economical ad-
ministrative remedies. See supra note 168.
171. See Biehler, supra note 36, at 6.
172. Id
173. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975).
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mental constitutional interests must not be trivialized. Unfor-
tunately, due to the complex nature of constitutional law,
individuals often have difficulty recognizing rights violations 17 4
and securing legal counsel.175 Thus, brief limitations periods
for section 1983 claims may seriously harm plaintiffs.176
Although a personal injury analogy based on state law may
harm civil rights plaintiffs, interests of defendants and the
courts also are implicated. Because federal courts must apply
an awkward analogy, judicial resources are wasted, uniformity
suffers, and the appearance of arbitrary and unfair decision
making may surface. Asymmetry encourages appeals and un-
dercuts faith in judicial institutions. Defendants suffer because
shortened limitations periods incite plaintiffs to file unripe
claims, discourage settlement negotiations, and leave insuffi-
cient time for pursuit of administrative remedies. Finally, un-
duly brief limitations periods may provide inadequate time to
174. In Knoll v. Springfield Township School Dist., 699 F.2d 137 (3d Cir.
1983), cert granted, 468 U.S. 1204 (1984), vacated on other grounds and re-
manded, 471 U.S. 288 (1985), the court observed:
[T]he definition of rights and remedies under the Civil Rights Acts
has been an ongoing, dynamic process. Athough experienced federal
and state judges, members of the professoriat, and many, but not all,
lawyers may be acutely aware of this definitional process, this profes-
sional familiarity is not widespread among members of the public. We
are persuaded, therefore, that the average plaintiff who has been in-
jured by state action is not sufficiently conversant with the intrica-
cies and subtleties of constitutional law to recognize the constitutional
deprivation, consult a lawyer, and prepare a case for filing [within a
short limitations period].
Id. at 142 (quoting Shouse v. Pierce County, 559 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1977))
(emphasis added). Accord Okure v. Owens, 816 F.2d 45, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1987)
(noting that due to "constitutional dimensions ... recognition problems ... are
endemic in section 1983 litigation"); Childers v. Independent School Dist., 676
F.2d 1338, 1343 (10th Cir. 1982) (overturning lower court decision to apply six-
month limitations period to § 1983 claim); Green v. Coughlin, 633 F. Supp.
1166, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding one-year period inadequate); Saunders v.
New York, 629 F. Supp. 1067, 1070 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (same); see also infra note
191 and accompanying text (discussing formidable task facing civil rights liti-
gants before § 1983 claims may be filed).
175. It also is important to remember that many plaintiffs seeking redress
through § 1983 litigation do not have access to private counsel. Prisoners in-
carcerated in state prisons, persons residing in state institutions, and other in-
dividuals whose situations make them vulnerable to rights violations by state
actors file many § 1983 suits. Many of these plaintiffs appear pro se or must
rely on Legal Aid attorneys who may lack the time and resources available in
the private sector. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
176. Several courts have recognized the difficulties inherent in constitu-
tional tort litigation and have refused to apply brief limitations statutes. See
infra notes 187-189.
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recognize and prosecute legitimate constitutional rights
violations.
IV. RESOLUTION OF THE LIMITATIONS PROBLEM
A. A LEGISLATiVE SOLUTION
The Supreme Court crafted a well-meaning but flawed
opinion in Wilson v. Garcia.177 The personal injury characteri-
zation is too ambiguous to provide guidance when state law
does not contain obvious choices. Wilson compelled courts to
waste vital judicial resources and to draw their own distinctions
concerning the choice of limitations periods and retroactive ap-
plication. The resulting lower court decisions appear arbitrary
and asymmetrical. In addition, the federal circuits diverge on
key interpretive issues.
Plainly the fault lies not with the notion of a uniform limi-
tations period for section 1983, but with the incomplete uni-
formity created by an imprecise state law analogy.178 Congress
is best able to supply a uniform limitations rule.179 Enactment
177. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
178. If the Supreme Court decided to address the § 1983 limitations issue
again, it could lessen confusion by clarifying Wilson or adopting another anal-
ogy. If the Court decided to salvage Wilson, it would need to delineate princi-
ples by which the lower courts could assess retroactive application and choose
between different personal injury statutes. Such principles are beyond the
scope of this Note.
If the Court determined that borrowing limitations from state law was
"inconsistent" with the federal policies underlying § 1983, it could borrow a pe-
riod from federal law, as long as "such laws are suitable to carry [the civil and
criminal civil rights statutes] into effect." Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 48
(1984) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)). A portion of the Federal Tort Claims
Act dealing with time limits for commencing actions against the United States,
28 U.S.C. § 2401 (1982), provides a likely analogy. See id § 2401(a)-(b).
Although borrowing from federal law once seemed inconceivable, recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court show that the Court will borrow from federal law
when federal concerns are paramount. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-
Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2767 (1987) (adopting four-year limitations pe-
riod from federal Clayton Act for RICO claims); McAlister v. Magnolia Petro-
leum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 224 (1958) (applying federal limitations period to
unseaworthiness action combined with action under federal Jones Act).
Despite the availability of judicial remedies, congressional enactment of a
federal limitations period remains the best solution. See infra note 179 and ac-
companying text.
179. Several commentators have suggested that congressional enactment of
a uniform statute of limitations is the best solution to the § 1983 limitations
problem. See Biehler, supra note 36, at 34 ("The most effective solution to the
convolution of civil rights limitation law would be the congressional passage of
a federal limitation."); ARIZONA Comment, supra note 5, at 141 ("The most ap-
propriate solution ... would be Congress' enactment of a federal statute of
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of a federal limitations period would minimize collateral litiga-
tion, increase predictability, and benefit litigants. A defined
statute of limitations for section 1983 would allow parties to as-
sess liabilities accurately and to know with certainty when
claims were stale. Additionally, judicial decisions would appear
more rational and reasonable and would strengthen public faith
in legal institutions.
This Note proposes a model amendment containing a
three-year statute of limitations'80 for section 1983 claims. This
amendment addresses the issue of retroactive application L8' and
allows for the pursuit of administrative remedies. L8 2 Although
the suggested limitations period insures that alert plaintiffs will
have adequate time to recognize and prepare civil rights claims,
the three-year limit is brief enough to protect defendants' inter-
ests in repose and to relieve courts of the burden of stale
claims. To avoid the problems surrounding past attempts to
amend section 1983,183 the model amendment offers extremely
limited changes and attempts to balance all competing
limitations."); NOTRE DAME Note, supra note 38, at 452 ("Ideally, Congress
should legislate a specific limitations period .... "); WAYNE Note, supra note
36, at 73 ("The ultimate solution: ... a uniform, national limitations period").
180. The only exception to the three-year limit applies to those plaintiffs
temporarily out of the United States or suffering from a disability when the
claim arises. In these unique situations, claimants could bring § 1983 actions
within two years after return or recovery. See Model Amendment, infra, at
lines 9-11.
181. The model amendment applies to actions arising after and pending on
the date of enactment. See Model Amendment, infra, at lines 14-18.
182. The model amendment is drafted to facilitate state and federal admin-
istrative remedies. Because pursuit of these remedies and other state judicial
remedies often consumes long time periods, the model amendment suggests
that any time used pursuing such remedies should not be counted in determin-
ing the time within which a complaint must be filed. See Model Amendment,
infra, at lines 11-13. This is consistent with the intent and remedial purpose of
section 1983. See infra notes 187, 196 and accompanying text; see also Felder v.
Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2308 (1988) (holding that state notice-of-claim statutes
do not apply to § 1983 because they undermine statute's "uniquely federal
remedy") (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972)); Patsy v. Board
of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982) (holding that claimants need not exhaust
state remedies before filing § 1983 actions).
183. See infra note 184 for a discussion of previous, unsuccessful § 1983
amendments. Because the amendment process tends to divide along partisan
lines, and because § 1983 traditionally has been a political "hot potato," a less
controversial legislative proposal might ultimately settle the § 1983 dilemma.
A federal catch-all statute would greatly simplify federal litigation. For an
early and unsuccessful attempt to legislate a one-year federal catch-all, see
H.R. 2788, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CONG. REc. 2926 (1945) and S. 1013, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CONG. REc. 4692 (1945); see also ARIZONA Comment, supra
note 5, at 98 n.3 (noting H.R. 2788); see generally NOTRE DAME Note, supra
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interests.184
B. THE MODEL AMENDMENT 185
A BILL
To amend section 1979 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982)), relating to civil actions for the
deprivation of rights, to provide a limitations period
applicable to all actions brought under this
provision.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
2 States of America in Congress assembled,
3 That See. 2. Section 1979 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. § 1983
4 (1982)) is amended to read as follows:
5 (1) by inserting "(a)" immediately before "Every"; and
6 (2) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
note 38, at 453 n.100 (citing H.R. 2788 and commentators favoring federal
catch-all).
Although a federal catch-all of sufficient length would be a better solution
to the limitations problem than the present personal injury characterization,
such a catch-all is undesirable because it would not represent a deliberative at-
tempt to weigh the interests inherent in § 1983 litigation.
184. As Justice O'Connor noted in her dissenting opinion in Wilson, earlier
attempts to legislate a limitations period have failed. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 284.
There have been five attempted § 1983 amendments. See S. 436, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S1264 (Feb. 7, 1985); S. 585, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127
CONG. REc. 3209 (1981); S. 990, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 7247
(1981); S. 1983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 31,130 (1979); H.R. 12874,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 8616 (1976); see generally Sagafi-Nejad,
supra note 52, at 373-76 (describing previously proposed amendments to
§ 1983).
The bills that reached committee reflected radically different conceptions
of § 1983. Apparently, the divisions were also political. For example, S. 436,
supra and S. 585, supra, sponsored by Senators Hatch and Thurmond, con-
servative Republicans, attempted to limit § 1983 to enforcement of equal rights
laws and to add an exhaustion of state remedies requirement and an 18-month
limitations period. S. 1983, supra, resubmitted as S. 990, supra, sponsored by
Senators Mathias, Kennedy, and Metzenbaum, all liberal Democrats, tried to
expand municipal and supervisory liability, foreclose state exhaustion require-
ments, and impose a four-year limitations period. See Sagafi-Nejad, supra note
52, at 401-03.
Unlike these bills, the model amendment proposed in this Note attempts
no great change in the scope or enforcement of § 1983. Its goals include the
minimization of unnecessary litigation, certainty through uniformity, and the
promotion of fairness to plaintiffs and defendants. The model amendment at-
tempts to forge a limited and reasonable compromise that can survive political
pressures.
185. Although this amendment differs substantially in length and scope, it
owes much in form and structure to previous congressional attempts to amend
§ 1983. See S. 436, § 1983, supra note 184. See supra note 184 for a discussion
of these attempts.
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7 (b)(1) Every civil action commenced under this Act shall be barred unless
8 the complaint is filed within three years after the right of action first
9 accrues. The action of any person under legal disability or outside the
10 United States at the time the claim accrues may be commenced within two
11 years after the disability ceases. Any time spent seeking relief through
12 federal or state administrative or state judicial remedies shall not be
13 counted in determining the time within which the complaint must be filed.
14 (2) This Act shall apply in any action arising as a result of any
15 deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
16 Constitution or laws of the United States and with respect to the
17 amendment herein made, to any action pending on the date of enactment
18 of this Act and to any action subsequently brought.
C. ADVANTAGES OF A THREE-YEAR LIMITATIONS PERIOD
The three-year period is desirable because it promotes the
fairness embodied in the policies of section 1983.186 Several
courts, both before and after Wilson, have found that limita-
tions periods of two years or fewer than two years violate the
federal policies manifested in section 1983.J87 These courts bor-
rowed a three-year statute of limitations188 because they found
186. The Supreme Court outlined the policies underlying § 1983 in Robert-
son v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978): "The policies underlying § 1983 include
compensation of persons injured by deprivation of federal rights and preven-
tion of abuses of power by those acting under the color of state law." Id. at
590-91.
187. See, e.g., Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 862 (2d Cir. 1981)
(stating that "federal policy should establish a floor [of two years] for the limi-
tations period of § 1983 suits"), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
Courts invalidating limitations periods of two years or fewer generally
found short limitations inconsistent with the legislative purpose of § 1983. For
example, in Paul, the Second Circuit held that a statute providing a 15-month
limitations period was incompatible with the purposes of § 1983 claims, and se-
lected a three-year period provided by another statute. Id. at 866. The court
cited a limitations statute applicable to the wrongful actions of federal law en-
forcement officers, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680(h) (1976), and noted:
A federal court, searching for an analogous state limitations period
for a § 1983 suit, should not select any period shorter than the two
years Congress has specified as the time within which notice must be
given of claims against the United States for unlawful actions by fed-
eral law enforcement officers.
Pauk, 654 F.2d at 862, cited with approval in Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42,
55 n.18 (1984) (affirming Fourth Circuit decision selecting three-year limita-
tions period for § 1983 claim). Accord Napoleon v. Xerox Corp., 671 F. Supp.
908, 911 (D. Conn. 1987); Green v. Coughlin, 633 F. Supp. 1166, 1169 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Saunders v. New York, 629 F. Supp. 1067, 1069-70 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); see
also Okure v. Owens, 816 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1987) (selecting a three-year limit
based on federal interests); cf Regan v. Sullivan, 557 F.2d 300, 303-04, 307 (2d
Cir. 1977) (finding that three-year New York statute of limitations satisfied
federal interests in Bivens action).
188. See Paul, 654 F.2d at 866; Coughlin, 633 F. Supp. at 1169; Saunders,
629 F. Supp. at 1170; see also infra note 196 and accompanying text (arguing
[Vol. 73:85
CIVIL RIGHTS
this period consistent with the policies of equity and fairness
underlying section 1983.189 Fairness, in fact, mandates a three-
year period. Because section 1983 is often the vehicle for highly
complex claims,190 a two-year limitations period will not pro-
vide sufficient time to recognize and prepare many section 1983
claims.19 1 The inability of many section 1983 claimants to hire
that Supreme Court implicitly endorsed three-year limitations period for
§ 1983 claims).
189. In Okure v. Owens, 816 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987), the Second Circuit re-
cently selected a three-year limitations period because the "three year limit
... more faithfully represents the federal interest in providing an effective
remedy for violations of civil rights than does [a] restrictive one year limit."
Id at 49 (emphasis added).
190. Section 1983 has been and continues to be used in highly complex liti-
gation aimed at correcting systemic inequality. See, e.g., Morgan v. Hennigan,
509 F.2d 580, 582 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1974) (ordering desegregation of Boston public
school system), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp.
1265, 1275 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (class action brought under § 1983 compelling im-
provements in prison conditions throughout the Texas correctional system),
affd in par rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.), amended in par vacated
in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); see also
cases noted by Blackmun, supra note 2, at 19-20 (illustrating significance of
§ 1983 in civil liberties litigation since Monroe v. Pape, 265 U.S. 167 (1961));
supra note 174 and accompanying text and infra note 191.
191. As the Supreme Court has noted, such litigation often requires a great
deal of pre-filing planning.
Litigating a civil rights claim requires considerable preparation. An
injured person must recognize the constitutional dimensions of his in-
jury. He must obtain counsel, or prepare to proceed pro se. He must
conduct enough investigation to draft pleadings that meet the require-
ments of federal rules; he must also establish the amount of his dam-
ages, prepare legal documents, pay a substantial filing fee or prepare
additional papers to support a request to proceed in forma pauperis,
and file and serve his complaint.... He must be prepared to with-
stand various responses, such as a motion to dismiss, as well as to un-
dertake additional discovery.
Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1984) (footnote omitted).
Given this sort of burden, it is questionable whether one- or even two-year
limitations periods will provide sufficient time. A three-year period offers ad-
ditional protection in complex § 1983 cases. In a recent case, the Second Cir-
cuit adopted similar reasoning:.
We are not persuaded that because the personal injuries actionable
under section 1983 are typically intentional, they are necessarily ap-
parent to the victim at the time they are inflicted .... Even where
the injury itself is obvious, the constitutional dimensions of the tort
may not be. This situation might arise where it is unclear that the
tortfeasor acted under color of state law or that the act [complained]
of was illegal. It may be that the legality of the act.., has not been
previously adjudicated. Because recognition problems such as these
are endemic in section 1983 litigation, we believe that there must be
time for plaintiffs to reflect and to probe. The three year period of
limitations [chosen by the court] ... accommodates the many complex
section 1983 claims.
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attorneys enhances the need for a three-year period. In addi-
tion to benefitting plaintiffs, a three-year period is fair and eq-
uitable to parties defending section 1983 claims. A three-year
limit will protect defendants from stale claims and actually
lessen their liability in some states.192 Because a three-year
limitations period is currently the law in many jurisdictions,193
settled expectations will not be disturbed unfairly. Finally, a
three-year period will not tax the federal court system exces-
sively. The experience of courts indicates that three years is a
workable limit for litigants and the courts.194
A three-year limitations period for section 1983 claims is
also desirable because the Supreme Court has endorsed it by
implication. As noted earlier,195 the Wilson Court assumed
that the lower courts would have little difficulty isolating a
general tort statute similar to the New Mexico statute. In addi-
tion, the Court apparently assumed that three years was a typi-
Okure v. Owens, 816 F.2d at 48-49 (footnote omitted).
192. In some states the limitations period for § 1983 claims exceeds three
years. These include Maine, see Small v. Inhabitants of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544,
549 (1st Cir. 1986) (six years), Missouri, see Farmer v. Cook, 782 F.2d 780, 780-
81 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (five years), Alabama, see Jones v. Preuit &
Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250, 1256 (11th Cir. 1985) (six years), and Nebraska, see Epp
v. Gunter, 677 F. Supp. 1415, 1420-21 (D. Neb. 1988) (four years). A three-year
limitations period would make defendants in these states less susceptible to
§ 1983 attack.
Because of the importance of the remedy and the significant constitutional
interests at stake, shortening any § 1983 limitations periods is prima facie un-
desirable. Nonetheless, the interests of potential defendants, of certainty, of
predictability, and of simplification of litigation, together with the interests of
plaintiffs in states with periods of less than three years, must be balanced
against this undesirable effect. Given that the three-year period suggested by
the model amendment should be adequate to vindicate most claims, the for-
mer interests must prevail.
193. Federal courts in many states and the District of Columbia currently
apply a three-year limitations period to § 1983 claims. See Okure v. Owens, 816
F.2d at 49 (New York); Hughes v. Sheriff of Fall River County Jail, 814 F.2d
532, 533 (8th Cir. 1987) (South Dakota); Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County,
801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1986) (Washington); Lyons v. Goodson, 787 F.2d
411, 412 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (Arkansas); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d
44, 45 (6th Cir.), (Michigan) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 330 (1986); McKay v. Ham-
mock, 730 F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir. 1984) (Colorado); Wallace v. Town of
Stratford Bd. of Educ., 674 F. Supp. 67, 70 (D. Conn. 1986) (Connecticut);
Griggs v. Lexington Police Dep't, 672 F. Supp. 36, 38 (D. Mass. 1987) (Massa-
chusetts); Hooper v. Sachs, 618 F. Supp. 963, 979 (D. Md. 1985) (Maryland); cf.
Banks v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1416, 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(District of Columbia) (applying three-year period to § 1981 claims by analogy
to § 1983).
194. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (citing jurisdictions that
employ a three-year limitations period for § 1983 actions).
195. See text following notes 120-22, supra.
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cal limitations period for general tort statutes. Because it
affirmed selection of the New Mexico statute, the Wilson
Court offered guidance by example and implicitly endorsed a
three-year limitations period. This endorsement is fully consis-
tent with other recent Supreme Court opinions affirming three-
year limitations periods for section 1983 claims.1 96
Moreover, enactment of a three-year limitations period for
section 1983 claims is politically feasible. In the past,' 97 bills at-
tempting to amend section 1983 with an eighteen-month pe-
riod' 98 and a four-year period' 99 stalled in committee.20 0
Generally, these bills represented partisan attempts to narrow
or expand liability under section 1983.201 The model amend-
ment attempts to avoid such pitfalls. The model amendment
will not alter the remedial scope of section 1983. The three-
year limitations period strikes a compromise between the failed
limitations periods suggested by opposing political factions.20 2
Because a three-year limitations period would both limit and
196. In Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42 (1984), the Supreme Court declined
to apply a six-month limitations period to a discrimination claim brought
under § 1983 because such a period was too brief to satisfy the federal policies
underlying § 1983. Id at 55. Instead, the Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's
decision to borrow a three-year limitations period. Id-
Similarly, in Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980), the Court
examined the use of a three-year limitations period in relation to "deterrence"
and "compensation," the policies underlying § 1983. "Neither of these policies
is significantly affected by this rule of limitations since plaintiffs can still read-
ily enforce their claims... simply by commencing their actions within three
years." Id at 488.
Considered along with Wilson, these cases indicate, first, that the
Supreme Court has tacitly endorsed the application of a three-year limitations
period and, second, that such a limitations period is fully consistent with the
policies underlying § 1983.
197. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
198. See S. 436, supra note 184.
199. See S. 1983, supra note 184.
200. Other attempts to amend § 1983 without the addition of a limitations
period also have been unsuccessful. See S. 35, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG.
REc. 476 (1977).
201. See supra note 184.
202. Because the bills supported by prominent Republicans and Democrats
have advocated eighteen-month and four-year limitations periods respectively,
the true median is two years, nine months. This period is undesirable for two
reasons. First, it is unwieldy; courts and parties will value a limitations period
that is simple to calculate. Second, several courts have implicitly or expressly
endorsed the three-year period. See, e.g., Okure v. Owens, 816 F.2d 45, 49 (2d
Cir. 1987) (holding that three-year limitations period serves "the federal inter-
est in providing an effective remedy for violations of civil rights"); Pauk v.
Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 866 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting "[a] three year limi-
tations period is consistent with the broad remedial purposes of § 1983").
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expand section 1983 liability depending on local law, all sides
would gain, and resistance to the amendment would be eased.
Although critics may find frank consideration of political fac-
tors distasteful, the unique constitutional nature of section 1983
claims, the confusing state of the present law, the urgent need
for a clear uniform rule, and the failure of past amendments
make consideration of the political barriers imperative.
CONCLUSION
Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action against persons
who deprive others of their constitutional rights under color of
state law. Because the section contains no statute of limita-
tions, each federal court hearing a section 1983 claim must bor-
row a limitations period consistent with federal law and policy
from state law. In Wilson v. Garcia, the Supreme Court ruled
that states' general personal injury statutes would supply the
limitations period applicable to section 1983 claims. Unfortu-
nately, this holding offered little guidance for situations in
which state law lacked an obvious general personal injury stat-
ute or contained multiple possibilities. Similarly, the Court did
not address the issue of retroactive application of the new limi-
tations rule. Forced to remedy these flaws themselves, the
lower courts selecting limitations periods for section 1983
claims found unpredictable and conflicting ways to differentiate
between statutes, and split on the retroactivity issue.
In applying the personal injury characterization to section
1983 claims, many federal courts have assigned unduly short
limitations periods. Often the shortened limitations periods do
not allow adequate time to recognize and settle constitutional
tort claims, making pursuit of administrative remedies unat-
tractive and encouraging litigation. Further, because the new
limitations differ among and within the federal circuits, all par-
ties face uncertainty. These problems show that the section
1983 limitations issue remains unsettled.
This Note has suggested that the best solution rests with
Congress. By adopting the proposed amendment, Congress
could define a clear timetable that would instill uniformity and
predictability into section 1983 litigation. The proposed amend-
ment would settle the retroactivity issue, minimize unnecessary
litigation, and allow all parties to know with certainty which
claims were stale. The proposed solution would strike a ra-
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tional and equitable balance among rights of claimants, policies
of repose, and the needs of an overworked federal court system.
Paul Rathburn
